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Abstract
I develop the decision-theoretic approach to quantum probability, orig-
inally proposed by David Deutsch, into a mathematically rigorous proof
of the Born rule in (Everett-interpreted) quantum mechanics. I sketch the
argument informally, then prove it formally, and lastly consider a number
of proposed “counter-examples” to show exactly which premises of the
argument they violate.
(This is a preliminary version of a chapter to appear — under the
title “How to prove the Born Rule” — in Saunders, Barrett, Kent and
Wallace, Many worlds? Everett, quantum theory and reality, forthcoming
from Oxford University Press.)
1 Introduction
Thus we see that quantum theory permits what philosophy would
hitherto have regarded as a formal impossibility, akin to “deriving
an ought from an is”, namely deriving a probability statement from
a factual statement. This could be called deriving a “tends to” from
a “does”. (Deutsch 1999)
The “Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics” is just unitary quantum
mechanics, taken literally as a description of the world; it is a “many-worlds”
theory because it instantiates multiple, emergent, branching quasiclassical re-
alities. That much is commonplace amongst contemporary Everettians; it was
argued for in extenso in my other chapter in this volume, and for the purposes
of this chapter I will take it as read.
It is widely held, however, that a problem remains: namely, how does proba-
bility fit into this story? It is not in dispute what physical magnitude is supposed
to be (or to stand in for) probability: the probability of a branch is supposed to
be its weight (i. e. , its mod-squared amplitude). More formally, the probability
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of a history α represented by a history operator Ĉα (in the consistent-histories
formalism) is supposed to be
Pr(α) = 〈ψ| Ĉα |ψ〉 (1)
where |ψ〉 is the universal (Heisenberg-picture) state. In more parochial lan-
guage, if an observer’s branch has weight w0, if it is going to split into multiple
branches, and if those branches in which X happens have weight wX , then the
probability for that observer of X happening is supposed to be wX/w0.
What is in dispute is why, and how, this physical magnitude can be probabil-
ity. One might ask: how can it even make sense for anything to “be probability”
in a theory where all possible outcomes occur; less confrontationally, one might
ask what kind of argument can be given to justify the claim that mod-squared
amplitude is probability. (I have previously referred to these as the Incoherence
Problem and the Quantitative Problem respectively, though I shall not make
much of the distinction in this article.)
One quite legitimate response to this question, I think, is bemusement. Af-
ter all, formally speaking the measure defined by mod-squared amplitude on
any given space of consistent histories satisfies the algorithms for a probability.
Indeed, mathematically the setup is identical to any stochastic physical theory,
which ultimately is specified by a measure on a space of kinematically possi-
ble histories (albeit that measure is usually given indirectly, via a stochastic
differential equation). In Everett-interpreted quantum mechanics, the correct
space of consistent histories is the space of quasi-classical histories; as my earlier
chapter argued, this space may be imprecisely defined but this is no reason not
to take it seriously as emergent structure. So (goes the response) all the formal
requirements to take mod-squared amplitude as probability are in place; to ask
for more is no more justified than to ask why the physical quantity represented
by the metric in Newtonian space “is” length, or why other mathematical fea-
tures of classical physics represent mass or charge. (Saunders (1998) develops
this response in more depth.)
I have a good deal of sympathy for this response, but in this chapter I wish
to discuss a more positive answer to the question, which might be called the
decision-theoretic strategy.
Decision-theoretic strategy: Probability gets its meaning in quantum me-
chanics through the rational preferences of agents. In particular, a rational
agent who knows that the Born-rule weight of an outcome is p is rationally
compelled to act as if that outcome had probability p.
The decision-theoretic strategy was advocated by Deutsch (1999). In the
same paper he presented an informal proof, from principles of decision theory
that (he argued) did not themselves invoke probabilistic notions, that the only
rational strategy for an agent in an Everettian universe is to follow the Born
rule. I developed Deutsch’s proof further, and presented alternative versions of
it, in Wallace (2003) and Wallace (2007).
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The argument has met with its share of criticism. Some of the criticism
(e. g. Barnum et al (2000), Lewis (2005)) has been directed at the proof it-
self; some (e. g. Albert and Price’s contributions to this volume) has sought
to undermine the possibility of a proof by proposing other, (allegedly) equally
rationally justifiable alternatives to the Born rule. (These, I should make clear,
are not proposed as positive suggestions as to how we should act if the Everett
interpretation is correct; they are intended rather as reductios.)
My purpose in this chapter is to give a self-contained defence of the decision-
theoretic strategy, culminating in a formal proof of the rational necessity of the
Born rule from axioms of decision theory which I will defend. Formalisation is
not often an aid to understanding, but when a result is controversial it can be
helpful to see exactly what is and is not required. Along the way I will showcase
some of the various proposed alternative strategies for Everettian rationality,
and show exactly how they conflict with the assumptions in the argument;
in doing so, I hope, the argument for making those assumptions will become
clearer.
My focus in the chapter is deliberately narrow. A proof that rational agents
in an Everett universe must act in accordance with the Born-rule probabilities
falls short of a full solution of the probability problem: we might also ask how
this decision-theoretic notion of probability connects with our use of probability
in assessing the evidence for quantum mechanics, or with our ordinary, pre-
theoretic notions of probability as a guide to action in cases of uncertainty. I
shall address neither question here, though (for discussions of the former ques-
tion, see Greaves and Myrvold’s contribution to this volume, Wallace (2006),
and part II of Wallace (2010); for the latter, see Wallace (2005), part III of
Wallace (2010), Saunders (1998), and Saunders’ contribution to this volume.)
I shall begin in section 2 with a brief discussion of decision theory in general,
and go on in section 3 to see how decision theory works in the Everett inter-
pretation. The main part of the paper (sections 4–8) states and proves, first
informally and then in full mathematical rigor, that the Born rule is the unique
rational strategy available in the Everett interpretation. I illustrate this result
(section 9) by considering a number of other proposed strategies, proposed at
various times and places as counterexamples to the necessity of the Born rule,
and show why those strategies are not in fact valid alternatives. I conclude with
a few more general observations about why the Born rule can indeed be proven,
and why the Everett interpretation is essential in such a proof.
2 Preamble: the decision-theoretic approach
Suppose an coin is to be tossed in five minutes’ time; and suppose that an
agent bets five dollars (at even odds) that it will land heads. There are two
interestingly different possible results: (i) the measurement gives result “up”
and the agent gets $5; (ii) the measurement gives result “down” and the agent
loses $5. If the result is heads, the agent will be pleased about the bet; if it is
‘tails he will be less delighted, though (if he is of an appropriate character) he
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may well still regard the bet as having been the right choice given his information
before the coin toss. (There are of course vastly more than two microscopically
distinct possible results; the division into two sets is based on the pragmatic
interests of the agent.)
In deciding whether to accept this bet as opposed to any number of other
bets, the agent has to weigh the cost to him if the result is “down” against the
benefit if it is “up”. Decision theory gives a precise answer to the question of
how he should carry out this weighting: he should assign some utility (some
real number) V(+$5) to receiving five dollars, and some other utility V(−$5) to
losing five dollars, and some third utility V($0) to neither getting nor losing it;
and he should assign a probability Pr(H) to heads; and he should take the bet
only if
Pr(H)× V(+$5) + (1− Pr(H))× V(−$5) > V($0). (2)
More generally, decision theory mandates that an agent should assign a utility
to each payoff, and a probability to each outcome, and that faced with any
decision, the agent should choose that option which maximises expected utility
with respect to those assignments.
(In elementary discussions, it is common just to assume V(+$N) = N , but
this is too simplistic: it is not irrational to refuse to trade your house for a
one-in-a-thousand chance of winning Microsoft. In fact, in a decision-theoretic
framework, what it means to say that one reward is twice as valuable as another
is that a 50% chance of getting the first is as valuable as getting the second with
certainty. See Savage (1972, pp.91–104) for more on this point.)
Why should an agent behave this way? Prima facie, it isn’t obvious at all
that he should try to maximise expected utility rather than, say, maximising
utility with respect to the square of the probability function; or maximising the
logarithm of utility; or just maximising the utility of the least good possible
outcome.
Decision theory has a standard answer to this question: if an agent has a
definite preference (which might be indifference) between any two bets, and if
that preference order obeys certain constraints which are purported to be nec-
essary conditions of rationality, and if the set of available bets has a sufficiently
rich structure, then it is possible to prove a representation theorem: a theorem
that for any such preference order there is a unique probability function, and
an essentially unique1 utility function, such that one bet is preferred to another
iff it has a higher expected utility. It follows that any agent whose preferences
cannot so be represented must be acting irrationally: that is, must somewhere
be violating a principle which (again, purportedly) is a necessary constraint on
rational action.
It will be instructive to present two such principles (both drawn from Savage
(1972)). The first is transitivity : if an agent prefers a to b and b to c, he should
prefer a to c. The second might be called dominance: if an agent will do better
1By “essentially unique” I mean unique up to positive affine transforms x −→ ax+ b, with
a positive. Fairly obviously, such transformations serve only to scale the expected utility of
all bets in the same way.
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through a than b whatever happens, he should chose a over b. (For instance, a
bet that pays ten dollars if a coin-toss lands heads and nothing if it lands tails
is to be preferred over a bet on the same toss that pays five dollars on heads
and minus five on tails).
There is an important weakness in this decision-theoretic argument which
needs to be stressed. It is a proof that rational agents must bet according
to some probability function, but it is silent on the connection between that
function and the “real” probabilities. No decision-theoretic principle is contra-
dicted by an agent who assigns probability 99/100 to an apparently-fair coin
landing “heads”, for instance. A minority of advocates of the decision-theoretic
approach simply deny that there is any such thing as objective or “real” proba-
bility; the majority just take it as a bare postulate that an agent should conform
his subjective probabilities to the objective probabilities when he knows the lat-
ter.2
This weakness actually rather undermines the use of probability as a criticism
of the Everett interpretation, even without the arguments of this paper: if
classical probability can give no justification of its probability rule, why ask
the Everettian for such a justification? But in fact, we will see that in the
Everett interpretation, not only can we use rationality considerations to make
sense of probabilities as well as in conventional decision theory, we can prove
and not merely postulate the link between those probabilities and the quantum-
mechanical weights.
3 Everettian Rationality
So: consider the Everettian version of the coin-toss. Instead of a coin, we have
a particle in a superposition of spin-up and spin-down (in some fixed direction);
instead of a coin-toss, we have a spin measurement. And instead of there being
two interestingly different possibilities, there are two interestingly different sets
of branches: the spin up branches, where (if the agent took the bet) he gets five
dollars, and the spin down ones, where he loses five dollars. In deciding whether
to accept this bet as opposed to any number of other bets, the agent has to
weigh the benefit to himself in the branches where the result is up against the
cost in the branches where the result is down. So the notion of a bet is at least
meaningful in the Everettian context.
Skeptic: The benefit isn’t to the agent: it’s to copies of that agent in the future.
Author: Sure. But that’s true in the non-Everettian just as in the Everettian
case. In either case, the reason the agent makes one choice rather than
another is because of his concern about his future interests — that is,
about the interests of his future self or selves.
2This is a simplification: a more general statement is that an agent’s subjective probability
in X conditional on the objective probability of X being p should in turn be p (this is known
as the Principal Principle, following Lewis (1980)). My main point stands, however: the
Principal Principle is postulated, not derived.
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And an agent’s future self is his future self just by virtue of the causal,
structural, dynamical relations between it and the agent’s past self. There
is (I assume!) no indivisible, immaterial soul which passes through my life
and magically makes me a single being: what makes the stages of me
at different times all me is that they are appropriately related. And it
seems, at least, that an Everettian agent’s future selves stand in all the
same relations to him as a non-Everettian agent’s future selves stand to
him.
Skeptic: There’s a pretty obvious disanalogy, though. In the Everettian case,
there’s more than one future self!
Author: Fair enough. (Though there are some subtleties here: see Saunders
and Wallace (2008), and also Saunders’ chapter in this volume, for a con-
strual of personal identity in which this is not the case.) But it’s hard to
see why, in the Everett case, I should regard my future self as any the less
me — why I should not treat his goals and desires, his hopes and dreams,
as my own — just because I actually have multiple such selves. And so
it’s hard to see why those future selves should be less relevant to my con-
siderations now — to my decision-theoretic preferences — than would be
the case in the absence of Everettian branching.
So an Everettian agent can be in a decision problem — can be faced with
a choice of bets — just as can a non-Everettian. And certainly one strategy
available to him is what might be called the “Born-rule strategy”: choose that
bet which maximises expected utility with respect to the Born-rule weights
(that is, the mod-squared amplitudes). An Everettian agent who adopted the
Born-rule strategy would make exactly the same choices between bets as would
a non-Everettian who adopted the Principal Principle with respect to the Born-
rule weights. The two would be indistinguishable in terms of their behavioural
dispositions.
Is it the only strategy? Advocates of Deutsch’s decision-theoretic strategy
say that it is. More precisely, they argue that given certain principles of ra-
tionality, and given knowledge of quantum mechanics, it can be proved that
any strategy other than the Born-rule strategy violates some rational constraint
on action. By analogy with the Representation Theorems of classical decision
theory, we might call such a result a (purported) Quantum Representation The-
orem.
Such a theorem can in fact be proved formally, and in sections 7-8 I will give
a formal proof of such a theorem. But since a fully formalised proof of a result
does not make for accessible reading, firstly I will give an informal version. In
sections 4-5 I will state informally, and motivate, the axioms I wish to use; in
section 7 I will argue informally why these axioms jointly entail a Quantum
Representation Theorem.
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4 The quantum decision problem
The situation I wish to consider is the following. A quantum state is to be
prepared in some superposition; the system is measured in some basis; a bet is
made by the agent on the outcome of that measurement. Our agent knows (we
assume) that the Everett interpretation is correct; he is also assumed to know
the universal quantum state, or at least the state of his branch. (The latter is
an unrealistic but convenient assumption; in practice, however, it suffices for the
agent to know the mod-squared amplitudes for each outcome of a measurement.)
His preferences can be represented by an ordering relation on these bets.
Since (in Everettian quantum mechanics, at any rate) preparations, measure-
ments, and payments made to agents are all physical processes, there is a certain
simplification available: any preparation-followed-by-measurement-followed-by-
payments can be represented by a single unitary transformation. So our agent’s
rational preference is actually representable by an ordering on unitary transfor-
mations.
We should acknowledge that not all unitary transformations represent some-
thing physically possible.3 In particular, transformations which lead to recoher-
ence — that is, to Everett branches merging — are certainly not performable
by any agent localised to a specific branch. But nonetheless we will consider a
fairly wide set of transformations to be available — exactly how wide is some-
thing that the axioms will spell out. (It might be worth recalling at this stage
that decision theory is concerned with the preferences an agent would have
when confronted with a particular decision — his dispositional preferences, in
philosophers’ language — and not just with what actually happens. It is most
unlikely that I will be offered a choice between the presidency of the World Bank
and the deputy leadership of the Al-Qaeda terror group, but I have a definite
preference between the two. As such, the assumption of a reasonably wide set
of transformations seems reasonable enough.)
We should also acknowledge in our decision-theoretic setup that decoherence
imposes a certain structure on the Hilbert space. We can represent this by a
resolution of the identity on the Hilbert space: that is, by a decomposition
of the space into subspaces, with each subspace pi corresponding to a possible
macrostate. The choice of macrostates is largely fixed by decoherence, although
the precise fineness of the grain of the decomposition is underspecified. (In the
model, of course, it will be precisely specified, but this just illustrates that the
model is artificially precise.) We call a macrostate available to an agent if there
is an available act which, when performed, leaves some of his future selves in
that macrostate.
Part of the point of the decomposition into macrostates is that an agent can
3Doesn’t only one unitary transformation represent something physically possible? Doesn’t
the Hamiltonian of the universe uniquely determine which transformation is performed? If this
is a problem, it is not specific to Everett: it is the ancient debate of free will vs. determinism.
Rather than get into this morass (though I recommend Dennett (1984) for reassurance that
the two are compatible), let me just note that we can talk about rational strategies even if an
individual agent is not free to choose whether or not his strategy is rational.
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be assumed not to care exactly what the microstate is within a given macrostate
(if he does care, we have defined the macrostates too coarsely). But in fact,
usually an agent will also be indifferent between a great many macrostates:
for instance, if offered a million dollars, I am indifferent as to the colour of
the cheque.4 It will be useful to consider a coarse-graining of the macrostate
subspaces into reward subspaces, such that an agent’s only preference is to which
reward subspace he is in. Formally speaking, “reward subspace” is a derived
concept within the decision theory.
In fact, for mathematical reasons it will be convenient to work both with
the set of macrostates and with the Boolean algebra E of arbitrary disjunctions
of macrostates5, which we call the event space. The formal development of the
theory will not actually require the assumption that the event space can be
constructed from a set of macrostates (though it does not rule out that assump-
tion). Indeed, since the fineness of grain of branches is indeed underspecified,
the branch structure might be best idealised in some particular situation by a
model in which the algebra is not constructed this way. (For instance, if the
Hilbert space is L2(RN ) ⊗ HE , where HE represents some subsystem of envi-
ronmental degrees of freedom, then we might wish to take the elements of E to
be the subspaces
ΣE = {f ⊗ v : E is an open subspace of RN and f has support in E} (3)
which cannot be generated from macrostates (unless we are willing to relax rigor
and consider eigenstates of position).
For simplicity, we will refer to the set of unitary transformations over which
an agent’s preference order is defined as acts. A different set may be relevant
for different physical states of the universe, so we will have cause to speak of
the acts available at a macrostate pi. (In view of the previous paragraph’s
comment, we might do better to talk of the acts which are contemplatable at pi;
I avoid this terminology mostly because it’s cumbersome.)
In fact, it will be simpler to talk of which acts are available at a given
event (not just a macrostate) — informally an act available at an event E =
pi1∨pi2∨· · ·∨piN is the conditional act ‘if the macrostate is actually pii, perform
Ui. This makes it much more straightforward to talk about the composition
of acts: if U is available at an event E, and V is available at the smallest
event containing the range of V , for instance, then V U ought to be the act of
performing U and V sequentially and so also should be available at E. In the
formal development we will state explicit rules to ensure that these and similar
compositions are available; for now we take it as tacit that they are.
We now need to represent the agent’s preferences between acts. Since those
preferences may well depend on the state, we write it as follows: if the agent
prefers (at ψ) act U to act U ′, we write
Û ψ Û ′. (4)
4The reader who doubts this claim is encouraged to test it empirically.
5Recall that the disjunction E ∨F of two subspaces of a Hilbert space is the closure of the
span of their union.
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To be meaningful, of course, this requires that U and U ′ are both available at
ψ’s macrostate. So ψ is to be a two-place relation on the set of acts available
at that macrostate. In the event formalism we use later, we will require ψ to
be a two place relation on the acts available at each event which contains ψ.
So much for the setup; now for the axioms. They come in two categories:
axioms of richness, which concern which acts are available to the agent (how
rich the structure of the set of acts is) and which are not connected to a par-
ticular agent’s preference order; and axioms of rationality, which constrain that
preference order.
The richness axioms, then, are
Reward availability: All rewards are available to the agent at any macrostate:
that is, the set of available acts always includes ones which give all of the
agent’s future selves the reward.
Branching availability: Given any set of positive real numbers p1, . . . pn sum-
ming to unity, an agent can always choose some act which has n different
macrostates as possible outcomes, and gives weight pi to the ith outcome.
Erasure: Given a pair of states ψ ∈ E and ϕ ∈ F in the same reward, there is
an act Û available at E and an act V̂ available at F such that Ûψ = V̂ ϕ.
Problem continuity: For each event E, the set of acts available at E is an
open subset of the set of unitary transformations from E to H.
These should mostly be uncontroversial. Branching availability and reward
availability are consequences of the relatively stylised decision problem we are
considering, where measurements are being made and payments are being pro-
vided; they reflect the facts (respectively) that quantum systems can be prepared
in arbitrary states and that envelopes of cash can always be given to people.
Erasure is slightly more complicated. It effectively guarantees that an agent
can just forget any facts about his situation that don’t concern things he cares
about (that, is, by definition: that don’t concern where in the reward space
he is). In thinking about it, it helps to assume that any reward space has an
“erasure subspace” available (whose states correspond to the agent throwing
the preparation system away after receiving the payoff but without recording
the actual result of the measurement, say). An “erasure act” is then an act
which takes the quantum state of the agent’s branch into the erasure subspace;
the agent is (by construction) indifferent to performing any erasure act, and
since he lacks the fine control to know which act he is performing, all erasures
should be counted as available if any are. It follows that, since for any two
such agents all erasures are available, in particular there will be two erasures
available satisfying the axiom.
I postpone a discussion of problem continuity until the axioms of rationality
have been introduced.
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5 The dictates of rationality
Moving on to the rationality axioms, they come in two groups. The first two
axioms are very general principles of rationality, as relevant in the classical as
in the quantum context.
Ordering: The relation ψ is a total ordering for each ψ on the set of acts
available at ψ, for each ψ (that is: it is transitive, irreflexive and asym-
metric, and if we define U ∼ψ V as holding whenever U ψ V and V ψ U
fail to hold, then ∼ψ is an equivalence relation).
Diachronic consistency: If U is available at ψ, and (for each i) if in the ith
branch after U is performed there are acts Vi, V ′i available, and (again for
each i) if the agent’s future self in the ith branch will prefer Vi to V ′i ,
then the agent prefers performing U followed by the Vis to performing U
followed by the V ′i s.
Ordering is utterly familiar (indeed, built in to our use of the ψ symbol) and
hopefully uncontroversial. But it is worth stressing that the reason it is uncon-
troversial is not (just!) that it would be unintuitive for an agent’s preferences
to violate ordering, but because it isn’t even possible, in general for an agent to
formulate and act upon a coherent set of preferences violating ordering.
Of course, in stylised and artificial special cases, it might be. If an agent
knows that he will be offered three acts chosen from a set of ten, he can ar-
bitrarily pick one element from each three-element subset, and elect to choose
that one. But of course, real decision problems aren’t that cleanly specified: the
precise number of acts available is vague or just indeterminate and the cognitive
cost of trying to pin down the size of that set is prohibitive (even when the very
act of trying to pin it down does not change the problem out of recognition).
Excluding stylised and occasional exceptions, then, ordering is constitutive of
rationality, not just intuitively necessary for it.
I have stressed this because, in fact, very much the same defence can be
offered of the less-familiar diachronic consistency principle, which in effect rules
out the possibility of a conflict of interest between an agent and his future
selves. In philosophy examples one often speaks of a (classical) agent as if he
were a continuum of independent entities, one for each time, each having his
own preference ordering. But of course actual decision-making takes place over
time. An agent’s actions take time to carry out; his desires and goals take time
to be realised. If his preferences do not remain consistent over this timescale,
deliberative action is not possible at all.
Of course, there are plenty of localised violations of diachronic consistency
even outside the Everettian context. If I tell my friend not to let me order
another glass of wine after my second, I acknowledge that my desires at that
point will conflict with my desires now. But notice that such situations
(a) are generally not taken to be rational;
(b) are indeed analysed as situations of conflict, where my present self acts to
prevent my future self having access to his preferred choice;
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(c) are localised, taking place against a general assumption of diachronic con-
sistency in myself and others (as when I assume that my friend’s future
self will indeed act on her agreement not to let me order the wine, or that
the morning after the night before, I’ll be glad that she did).6
Similarly: in a branching universe, to accept a conflict of interest between my
pre-branch and post-branch selves is to cease to see them as the same person.
If branching were an isolated occurrence, this might be possible: it is arguably
callous to make a copy of myself and send him off to do a dangerous or disagree-
able task — and, crucially for the point, to take actions designed to prevent him
shirking that task but it is not irrational.7 But Everettian branching is ubiqui-
tous: agents branch all the time (trillions of times per second at least, though
really any count is arbitrary). In the presence of widespread, generic violation
of diachronic consistency, agency in the Everett universe is not possible at all.
Skeptic: Stop there. You’re trying to argue that rationality (agency, if you like)
even makes sense in an Everett universe. You can’t do that by saying that
rationality is impossible unless such-and-such. Maybe there just isn’t any
coherent notion of rationality in the Everett interpretation?
Author: You misunderstand. I’m just saying that rationality requires di-
achronic consistency: that any rational strategy is a diachronically con-
sistent strategy. So I’m constraining the space of rationally possible be-
haviours. If it turns out to be empty, of course, we’re in trouble. But it
won’t: the Born-rule strategy is diachronically consistent and satisfies all
the other axioms. All I’m doing is restricting (eventually to zero) the set
of non-Born strategies.
Skeptic: What if the Born rule is also irrational?
Author: Which is to say: what if it violates some rationally required constraint
on action? Then we’re sunk. But it doesn’t.
Skeptic: What about —
Author: Yes, yes, “it’s rationally required to weight each branch equally”.
We’ll come to that.
Incidentally, the very idea of composing acts to make further acts also presup-
poses diachronic consistency: only if an agent can think of future decisions he
will make as his decisions, so that he can meaningfully make those decisions
(for all that there is always some possibility that he will change his mind) does
it make sense to consider composite acts.
6For arguments that ascriptions of irrationality only make sense against a presumed back-
drop of rationality, see Davidson (1973, 2004), Dennett (1987, pp. 83–116), and Lewis (1974).
7See the first part of Greg Egan’s novel Permutation City for a science-fictional exploration
of the idea — but notice that its plausibility relies on the copy’s actions being causally relevant
to the original, something not possible in the Everettian universe.
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The remaining rationality axioms are more specific to the Everettian context.
Their precise statements get a bit more technical, so I phrase them fairly loosely
here; as always, see section 7 for details and for reassurance there there isn’t
sleight-of-hand going on.
Microstate Indifference: An agent doesn’t care what the microstate is pro-
vided it’s within a particular macrostate.
Branching Indifference: An agent doesn’t care about branching per se: if a
certain measurement leaves his future selves in N different macrostates
but doesn’t change any of their rewards, he is indifferent as to whether or
not the measurement is performed.
State Supervenience: An agent’s preferences between acts depend only on
what physical state they actually leave his branch in: that is, if Uψ = U ′ψ′
and V ψ = V ′ψ′, then an agent whose prefers U to V given that the initial
state is ψ should also prefer U ′ to V ′ given that the initial state is ψ′ —
U ψ V iff U ′ ψ′ V ′.
Solution Continuity: If for some state ψ Û ψ Û
′
, then sufficiently small
permutations of Û and Û
′
will not change this.
Macrostate indifference is hopefully uncontroversial: it’s built into the definition
of macrostates, in fact. (The point being that an agent can have no practical
control as to what state he gets, within a particular macrostate, on familiar
statistical-mechanics and decoherence grounds.)
Solution continuity and branching indifference — and indeed problem conti-
nuity — can be understood in the same way, in terms of the limitations of any
physically realisable agent. Any discontinuous preference order would require
an agent to make arbitrarily precise distinctions between different acts, some-
thing which is not physically possible. Any preference order which could not
be extended to allow for arbitrarily small changes in the acts being considered
would have the same requirement. And a preference order which is not indiffer-
ent to branching per se would in practice be impossible to act on: branching is
uncontrollable and ever-present in an Everettian universe.8
Skeptic: Why assume a priori that the rational strategy must be physically
possible? Even if there is some strategy in an Everettian universe which
counts as rational, maybe it’s not physically possible to carry out that
strategy.
Author: That’s confused. Firstly, we already know there’s at least one possible
rational strategy: the Born rule. Secondly, what would it even be for a
strategy to be rational, but physically impossible? By that token, the
rational strategy for a trader is “always buy shares that are going to
increase in value”.
8The main source of branching is probably classically chaotic systems; see Zurek and Paz
(1994) for technical details, and Wallace (2001) for discussion.
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To be fair, a strategy might be literally impossible but be an idealization
of a possible strategy — after all, perfect rationality itself is an ideal-
ization. One might possibly relax the assumption of Continuity on these
grounds (and I’ll make some comments on that later), though I don’t re-
ally think it’s justified. But no strategy can approximate caring about
branch number, as we’ll see.
The other way to understand these assumptions is as prohibitions on strategies
that just exploit artefacts of our model. The branching structure — including
the well-defined number of branches associated with any act — is derived from
the set of macrostates, which is in turn derived from decoherence. But as I
argued in my earlier chapter in this volume that this structure has a significant
degree of arbitrariness associated with it, primarily in terms of the coarseness of
the grain of the macrostates (see also James Hartle’s contribution). Put simply,
in the actual physics there is no such thing as a well-defined branch number.
Similarly, in the actual physics there is no division of the dynamics into dis-
crete branching events followed by evolution of individual branches: branching,
rather, is continuous. But if branching is always going on, and cannot be quan-
tified in a non-arbitrary manner, then no strategy can be formulated which is
other than indifferent to the presence of branching.
A quick defence of state supervenience would be: the agent’s preferences
supervene on the actual state of the branch; transformations which differ only
in how they would affect non-actual quantum states do not differ in any relevant
respect.
Skeptic: Hang on. This brings out a tacit assumption in the formalism you’ve
adopted: the idea that acts can be represented by single unitary transfor-
mations rather than by sequences of unitary transformations. Why regard
a sequence of measurements as decision-theoretically equivalent to a single
measurement just because the same unitary transformation is enacted by
both?
Author: Here’s one possible defence. The agent is playing a sequence of games
which result in rewards that he spends only after the sequence is done. In
this case, what does he care about what happens during the brief period
in which the games are being played (when having or not having rewards
makes no difference to his status) — should he not care only about the
state of the universe after the payouts are all made?
Skeptic: Well, that sounds intuitive, but so what? We’re discussing the Everett
interpretation — appeals to intuition are going to ring a little hollow here.
Author: Fair enough. A far better defence is to observe that caring about the
final state only is the diachronic equivalent of branch indifference, and
can be defended in the same way. There is no “real” branching structure
beyond a certain fineness of grain, so the details of that structure can only
be included in terms of their coarse-grained consequences.
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Put another way: we could have defined our decision theory in terms of
preferences, not over final states, but over consistent history spaces. But
if we had done so, we would have needed both synchronic and diachronic
indifference assumptions: indifference both to the fineness of grain of the
history projectors at each time, and to the size of the temporal gaps be-
tween history projectors. Translated back into our setting, where we con-
sider sequences of decisions made only over very short periods of time, the
former assumption entails branch indifference and the latter entails that
acts can be represented by single unitary transformations.
6 A quantum representation theorem
We can now prove, in succession, three results, the first three of which are
(trivially) entailed by the fourth.
Equivalence lemma: If two acts assign the same weight to each reward, the
agent must be indifferent between them.
Nullity lemma: An agent is indifferent to a possible outcome of an act iff that
act has weight zero.
Dominance lemma: Suppose that two acts each only have two possible re-
wards r1, r2 as outcomes, with r1  r29 and that the first act assigns a
higher weight to r1 than the second act does. Then the first act must be
preferred to the second.
Born rule theorem: There is a utility function on the set of rewards, unique
up to affine transformations, such that one act is preferred to another iff
its expected utility, calculated with respect to this utility function and to
the quantum-mechanical weights of each reward, is higher.
Since all these results are proved formally in section 8, my purpose in this section
is explanation and not persuasion: I wish simply to show the general shape of
the proof.
The equivalence lemma is best illustrated by examples (here I basically follow
the argument of Wallace (2007)). For a simple case, suppose we have two acts (A
and B, say): in each, a system is prepared in a linear superposition α |+〉+β |−〉
and then measured in the {|+〉 , |−〉}. On act A, a reward is then given if the
result is ‘+’; on B, the same reward is given on ‘-’ instead. The resultant states
are
A : α |+〉⊗|reward〉+ β |−〉⊗|no reward〉 ; (5)
B : α |+〉⊗|no reward〉+ β |−〉⊗|reward〉 . (6)
9That is: with an act which returns some microstate in r1 with certainty preferred to
one which returns some microstate in r2 with certainty; that this determines a well-defined
ordering over rewards follows from microstate indifference.
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By erasure, there will exist acts available to the agent’s future self in the reward
branch (for both A and B) which erase the result of what was measured, leaving
only the reward. Performing these transformations, and the equivalent erasures
in the no-reward branch, leaves
A-plus-erasure: α |0〉⊗|reward〉+ β |0′〉⊗|no reward〉 ; (7)
B-plus-erasure: β |0〉⊗|reward〉+ α |0′〉⊗|no reward〉 . (8)
Now, by branch indifference, the agent’s future selves are indifferent to whether
this erasure is or is not performed. (Branch indifference is needed because
we have no guarantee that erasures are non-branching; if we did, microstate
indifference would suffice). So by diachronic consistency, the original agent is
indifferent between A and A-plus-erasure, and between B and B-plus-erasure.
But now: if α = β, then A-plus-erasure and B-plus-erasure leave the system
in the same quantum state. So by state supervenience, the agent is indifferent
between them. Since we know from ordering that preferences are transitive, the
agent must also be indifferent between A and B. Indeed, we actually require
only that |α| = |β|, for phase differences too can be erased.
For a slightly more complicated case, suppose game C involves a 2-state
system being prepared in state√
2/3 |+〉+
√
1/3 |−〉
and a reward being given on ‘+’, and game D involves a 3-state system being
prepared in state √
1/3(|+〉+ |0〉+ |−〉)
and a reward being given on ‘+’ and on ‘0’. The resultant states are then
C :
√
2/3 |+〉⊗|reward〉+
√
1/3 |−〉⊗|no reward〉 ; (9)
D :
√
1/3 |+〉⊗|reward〉+
√
1/3 |0〉⊗|reward〉+
√
1/3 |−〉⊗|no reward〉 . (10)
But by erasure, there is an act available for the future self of the agent in the
‘reward’ branch of game C which creates two equally-weighted branches:
|+〉⊗|reward〉 −→
√
1/2 |X〉⊗|reward〉+
√
1/2 |Y 〉⊗|reward〉 (11)
Since by branch indifference the agent’s future self is indifferent to performing
this act or not, by diachronic consistency the original agent is indifferent between
C and C-plus-branching. But the state produced by C-plus-branching is
C-plus-branching :
√
1/3 |X〉⊗|reward〉+
√
1/3 |Y 〉⊗|reward〉+
√
1/3 |−〉⊗|no reward〉 .
(12)
By a generalisation of our earlier argument, the agent is indifferent between
C-plus-branching and D, and so between C and D.
By arguments of this kind, the equivalence lemma can be proved for any act
with finitely many outcomes. The null and dominance lemmas are easy further
steps, using the second clause of diachronic consistency.
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We are now nearly done: the remainder of the proof is actually a standard
decision-theoretic method for constructing utilities. Pick two rewards R and S
with R  S, and assign R utility 1 and S utility 0. For any reward T satisfying
R  T  S, there is a unique number U(T ) such that the agent is indifferent
between getting T with certainty, and getting R on a branch of weight U(T ) and
S otherwise. (We need continuity to establish this and rule out the possibility
of rewards whose utilities differ only infinitesimally.)
Now consider an act which leads to rewards R,S, T with weights w(R),
w(S) and w(T) respectively. The agent’s future selves in the T branch are
indifferent between doing nothing and performing an act that delivers R with
weight U(T ) and S otherwise. Applying diachronic consistency once more, the
original agent is indifferent between the original act and an act which delivers
R with weight w(R) + w(T )U(T ) and an act which delivers S with weight
w(S) + (1 − U(T ))w(T ). Note that the utilities of these acts are the same: in
this particular case, the agent is indifferent between two acts iff they have the
same utility. Generalising the argument, and applying the dominance lemma,
tells us that one act is preferred to another iff its utility is higher.
The continuity axioms play only a limited role in these arguments. They
serve to rule out situations where two rewards are infinitesimally, or infinitely,
different in value; they are also required to handle the generalisation to acts
which have infinitely many rewards as possible outcomes.
7 Formal statement of the axioms
As promised, in this section and the next I lay out the formal version of my
decision theory and its associated proofs. The reader who is happy to take on
trust my mathematics — and my reassurances that there has been no sleight of
hand — is welcome to skip to section 9.
A quantum decision problem is specified by:
• A separable Hilbert space H. Given a set S of subspaces of H, I write
∨S (the disjunction of S) for the closure of the span of ∪S, and ∧S (the
conjunction of S) for the closure of ∩S; Given subspaces E and F , I define
E∨F = ∨{E,F} and likewise for ∧, and I write ΠE for the projector onto
E.
• A complete Boolean algebra E of subspaces of H, the event space. (So E
contains H and is closed under ∨, ∧, and taking the complement.) I define
a partition of an event E to be a set of mutually orthogonal events whose
conjunction is E.
• A subset M of E , the macrostates, such that for any event E, there is a
partition of E by macrostates.
• For each E ∈ E , a set UE of unitary operators from E into H, which we
call the set of acts available at E. We write OU for the smallest event
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containing the range of the act U10 and require that the choice of available
acts satisfies:
1. Restriction: If E,F ∈ E and F ⊂ E, then if U is available at E then
the unitary map U |F , defined by Uψ = U |Fψ whenever ψ ∈ F , is
available at F .
2. Composition: If U is available at E, and V is available at OU , then
V U is available at E.
3. Indolence: For any event E, if there are any acts available at E then
the identity 1̂E is available at E. (More precisely, the embedding
map of E into H is available at E.)
4. Continuation: If U is available at some E, then there is some act
available at OU .
5. Irreversibility : If U is available at E ∨ F , OU |E ∧ OU |F = ∅.
• A partition R of E (that is, a set of mutually orthogonal elements of E
whose disjunction is H), the set of rewards. These represent payoffs an
agent could get.
The simplest choice of macrostates and event space is to pick some particular
set of orthogonal subspaces of H whose disjunction is H, take this as M, and
take E to be the set of all disjunctions of subsets of M; this is the sense of
“macrostate” and “event” used in the informal version of the proof. However,
we could equally well take E to be an arbitrary Boolean algebra of subspaces
and define E =M. (As was noted previously, this sort of formalisation might be
more appropriate for decision problems with a less natural discrete structure.)
Rays within H, as usual, are called states. I adopt the usual convention of
representing a ray by any vector within it and of blurring the distinction between
the two; I do not require that vectors representing states be normalised. (This
is just for notational convenience.) If B(E,H) is the set of unitary maps from
E into H, it can naturally be regarded as a subset of B(H,H) by identifying U
with UΠE ; as such, B(E,H) inherits the norm topology.
I introduce a few derived concepts. The weight Wψ(E|U) of an event E with
respect to a state ψ and an act U is defined by
Wψ(E|U) = ‖ΠEU |ψ〉 ‖2 = 〈ψ|U†ΠEU |ψ〉 . (13)
A reward function is any function from R to [0, 1] such that ∑r∈R w(r) = 1.
Any pair of a state ψ ∈ E and an act U available at E determines a reward
function
Rψ,U (r) =Wψ(r|U) (14)
which I call the characteristic reward function of U and ψ.
10We can define OU explicitly as the conjunction of all events containing the range of U ;
this suffices to show that OU is well-defined.
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A set F of events is available if they are mutually orthogonal and there is
at least one act available at ∨F . (An event is available iff its singleton set is
available).
Finally, if S is any set of rewards, I say that an act A has rewards in S iff
its range is a subset of ∨S. If u is a real function of S and U is an act whose
rewards are in S, the expected utility of U with respect to a state ψ (and, tacitly,
with respect to u) is
EUψ(U) =
∑
r∈S
Wψ(r|U)u(r) ≡
∑
r∈S
Rψ,U (r)u(r). (15)
Stating the richness axioms is a little fiddly, because of the need to make sure
not only that certain acts (erasures, branchings etc) are available everywhere,
but to make sure that they are available on multiple branches concurrently.
To state them in a concise way, I make the following definitions. Firstly, if
P = {p1, p2, . . .} is a (countable or finite) set of positive real numbers whose
sum is unity, and ψ ∈ M ⊂ r for some state ψ, macrostate M , and reward r,
then a P-branching of ψ is some act U available at M such that OU ⊂ r and
such that there is a partition M = {M1,M2, . . .} of OU by macrostates with
Wψ(Mi|U) = pi. (Informally, a P-branching is an act which splits the agents
branch into many branches, each having the same weight as an element of P,
but without changing the rewards that the agent gets.)
Secondly, if M and M ′ are macrostates with M ⊂ r and M ′ ⊂ r for some
reward r, and ψ,ψ′ are states in M , M ′ respectively, then an erasure of ψ and
ψ′ is a pair of acts U , U ′ available at M and M ′ respectively, such that OU and
OU ′ are both subsets of r and Uψ = U ′ψ′.
And thirdly, if F is an available set of events, an act function U for that set
is a function which assigns to each F ∈ F an act U(F ) available at F . An act
function is compatible if ∑
F∈F
U(F )ΠF (16)
is available at ∨F .
The richness axioms are now stateable:
Reward availability: Suppose that F is an available set of macrostates and
f is a function from F into rewards.
Then there is a compatible act function U for F with U(F ) ⊂ f(F ) for all
F ∈ F .
Branching availability: Suppose that F is an available set of macrostates
and for each F ∈ F , ψF is a nonzero state in F and PF is a (finite or
countable) set of positive real numbers summing to unity.
Then there is a compatible act function U for F such that for each F ∈ F ,
U(F ) is a PF -branching of ψF .
Erasure: Suppose that {r1, r2, . . .} is a (finite or countable) set of rewards,
that M = {M1,M2, . . .} and N = {N1, N2, . . .} are two available sets of
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macrostates with Mi ⊂ ri and Ni ⊂ ri, and that for each i, ψi ∈ Mi and
ϕi ∈ Ni are nonzero states.
Then there are compatible act functions U for M and V for N such that,
for each i, (U(Mi),V(Ni)) is an erasure of ψi and ϕi.
Problem Continuity: For every available E, the set of acts available at E is
an open subset (in operator norm topology) of the set of unitary maps
from E to H.11
Notice that reward availability and preparation together entail that for any
reward function and any ψ ∈ E, there is an act U available at E such that ψ
and U have that reward function as their characteristic reward function.
We now define a state-dependent solution to a decision problem as specified
by an assigment to every available macrostate E, and every state ψ ∈ E , of a
two-place relation ψ on the acts available at E. (Strictly our notation should
include E but for simplicity, its value will always be tacit.)
We call an event N null for a given state ψ and act U iff, whenever acts V1
and V2 are identical on the complement of N , V1U ∼ψ V2U . (So an event is
null if the agent doesn’t care what happens to his future selves, if any, in the
branch defined by that event. We will shortly see that, as expected, an event is
null iff there are in fact no such future selves.) It is easy to see that any finite
union of null sets is null, as is any subset of a null set.
We can now state the rationality axioms:
Ordering: For every ψ for which it is defined, ψ is a total ordering. That is:
it is transitive, asymmetric, and the relation ∼ψ, defined by E ∼ψ F iff
neither E ψ F nor F ψ E, is an equivalence relation. (As usual, we
write ‘E ψ F ’ as an abbreviation for ‘either E ψ F or E ∼ψ F ’.)
Diachronic Consistency: Suppose U is available at E, and V1 and V2 are
available at OU . Then:
(i) If there is some partition P ofOU into macrostates such that V1|E ΠEUψ
V2|E for every element E of the partition not null with respect to ψ
and U , then V1U ψ V2U .
(ii) If in addition, V1|E ΠEUψ V2|E for at least one such E, then V1U ψ
V2U .
Macrostate indifference: If:
• U, V are acts available at M ;
• U ′, V ′ are acts available at M ′;
• OU ⊂ M1 ∧ r1 and OU ′ ⊂ M1 ∧ r2 for some macrostate M1 and
reward r1;
11The operator norm topology on the set of linear maps between normed spaces V and W
is defined by the norm ‖U‖ = sup{‖Ux‖ : ‖x‖ = 1}. The set of unitary maps from E to H is
a subset of the set of all maps between those two spaces, and inherits the latter’s topology.
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• OV ⊂ M2 ∧ r2 and OV ′ ⊂ M2 ∧ r2 for some macrostate M2 and
reward r2
then for any ψ,ψ′ with ψ ∈M and ψ′ ∈M ′, U ψ V iff U ′ ψ′ V ′.
Branching indifference: If:
• r is a reward;
• M is a macrostate with M ⊂ r;
• U is available at M ;
• ψ ∈M and Uψ ∈ r
then U ∼ψ 1̂M .
State supervenience: If:
• ψ ∈ E and ψ′ ∈ E′ for macrostates E,E′;
• U and V are available at E, and U ′ and V ′ are available at E′;
• Uψ = U ′ψ′ and V ψ = V ′ψ′
then U ψ V iff U ′ ψ′ V ′.
Solution continuity: If E is a macrostate and ψ ∈ E, if U,U ′ are available
at E, and if U ψ U ′, then in the space of unitary maps from E into H
there are neighbourhoods (in norm topology) N ,N ′ of U , U ′ respectively
such that any act in N available at E is preferred (at ψ) to any act in N ′
available at E.
Given a solution to a quantum decision problem, we can use it to define a
preference ordering on rewards: for any two rewards, r1  r2 iff there is some
macrostate E, some state ψ ∈ E, and acts U1, U2 available at E such that
OUi ⊂ ri and U1 ψ U2. Provided that the problem is reward-available and
the solution is macrostate-indifferent and branching-indifferent, this preference
order is a total ordering on R. If r and s are rewards with r  s, I will say that
a reward t is between r and s iff s  t  t; I write [r, s] for the set of rewards
between r and s.
If M consists of some set of orthonormal subspaces (as in the informal
proof), then this observation more or less exhausts the usefulness of macrostate
indifference. At the other extreme, if M=E then macrostate indifference actu-
ally entails branch indifference. The distinction between the axioms, then, is a
matter of how we mathematically represent the branching structure — which
is appropriate, since the motivation for branching indifference itself is that the
details of that structure are an unphysical artefact of the mathematics.
(The mathematically inclined reader may be wondering at this point if the
axioms are consistent. To show that they are, consider the following model. Let
HR be a two-dimensional Hilbert space with an orthogonal basis {|+〉 , |−〉}; for
each N > 0 let {HN} be an N -dimensional Hilbert space with an orthonormal
basis {|N, 1〉 , |N, 2〉 , . . . |N,N〉}.
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Now: take the Hilbert space of our decision problem to be
H = HR ⊗ (⊕∞I=1HI) , (17)
so that a complete basis of states is
|±〉⊗|N,M〉 (M ≤ N), (18)
and take the macrostates to consist of all the one-dimensional subspaces spanned
by each of these states, and the events to be all disjunctions of macrostates. The
available events are all those which are contained in some fixed HR ⊗HN , and
the acts available at an available event contained in HR ⊗ HN are all unitary
maps from HR ⊗ HN to HR ⊗ HN ′ , with N ′ > N . The reward subspaces are
H± = {Span |±〉} ⊗ H. Finally, an act U is preferred to an act U ′ at |ψ〉 iff∥∥∥(|+〉 〈+| ⊗ 1̂)U |ψ〉∥∥∥ > ∥∥∥(|+〉 〈+| ⊗ 1̂)U ′ |ψ〉∥∥∥ . (19)
I leave readers to satisfy themselves that this system does indeed obey the
axioms; the preference order is, of course, the Born rule.)
8 Formal statement and proof of the represen-
tation theorem
Equivalence Lemma: Suppose that:
(i) P is a quantum decision problem satisfying erasure, branch availabil-
ity and reward availability;
(ii) ψ is a state-dependent solution to P satisfying ordering, diachronic
consistency, macrostate indifference, branching indifference, and state
supervenience;
(iii) U and V are available at E, and U ′ and V ′ are available at E’;
(iv) ψ ∈ E and ψ′ ∈ E′;
(v) Rψ,U = Rψ′,U ′ and Rψ,V = Rψ′,V ′ .
(vi) The reward functions of the acts are each non-zero for only finitely
many rewards.
Then U ψ V iff U ′ ψ′ V ′.
Proof: For each reward r for which Rψ,U (r) 6= 0, let Mr and Nr be partitions
of OU ∧ r and OU ′ ∧ r respectively, and let #Mr and #Nr be the number of
elements (finite or infinite) in Mr and Nr respectively.
Define the sets Pr (for each r)
Pr = {Wψ′(N |U ′)/Wψ′(r|U ′) : N ∈ Nr} (20)
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These are sets of positive real numbers summing to unity, so by branching
availability there is an act W available at OU such that, for each r and each
M ∈Mr, W |M is a Pr-branching of ΠMUψ: it splits ΠMUψ, which has weight
Wψ(M |U), into #Nr states, one for each N ∈ Nr, with weights Wψ(M |U) ×
Wψ′(N |U ′)/Wψ′(r|U ′). There is therefore12 a partitionW ofOW into macrostates,
such that:
• For each reward r there are #Mr ×#Nr elements of W in r.
• Each such element can be labelled by pairs of elements from Mr and Nr:
let us write it as KrM,N .
• Wψ(KrM,N |WU) =Wψ(M |U)×Wψ′(N |U ′)/Wψ′(r|U ′).
Furthermore, by branching indifference, W |M ∼ΠMUψ 1̂M for any macrostate
M , and hence by diachronic consistency, WU ∼ψ U .
Applying the same procedure with U and U ′ reversed yields an act W ′ such
that W ′U ∼ψ U , and a partition W ′ of OW ′ by macrostates, such that
• For each reward r there are #Mr ×#Nr elements of W ′ in r.
• Each such element can be labelled by pairs of elements from Mr and Nr:
we write it as K ′rM,N .
• Wψ′(K ′rM,N |WU) =Wψ(M |U)×Wψ′(N |U ′)/Wψ(r|U).
But since
Wψ(r|U) ≡ Rψ,U (r) = Rψ′,U ′(r) ≡ Wψ′(r|U ′), (21)
it follows that Wψ(KrM,N |WU) =Wψ′(K ′rM,N |W ′U ′).
So we have constructed acts W , W ′ and partitions W = {W1, . . .}, W ′ =
{W ′1, . . .} of OW , OW ′ by macrostates such that:
1. For any i, Wi exists iff W ′i does (i. e. , the two partitions have the same
number of elements) and there is some reward r such that Wi and W ′i are
elements of r.
2. Wψ(Wi|WU) =Wψ(W ′i |W ′U) for all Wi.
Now define
χi = ΠWiWUψ/‖ΠWiWUψ‖ (22)
and
χ′i = ΠW ′iW
′U ′ψ′/‖ΠW ′
i
W ′U ′ψ′‖. (23)
By erasure, there exist acts X, X ′ available at OW , OW ′ such that (X|Wi)χi =
(X ′|W ′
i
)χ′i. By branching indifference, X|Wi ∼χi 1̂Wi , so by diachronic consis-
tency, XWU ∼ψ WU ∼ψ U ; similarly, X ′W ′U ′ ∼ψ′ U ′.
12We appeal here to the irreversibility requirement on decision problems.
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Since
XWUψ =
∑
i
Wψ(Wi|WU)(X|Wi)χi, (24)
it follows that XWUψ = X ′W ′U ′ψ′.
So: for U and U ′, we have found acts Y = XWU and Y ′ = X ′W ′U ′ such
that U ∼ψ Y , U ′ ∼ψ′ Y ′, and Y ψ = Y ′ψ′. Repeating this process for V and
V ′, we can find acts Z,Z ′ such that Z ∼ψ V , Z ′ ∼ψ′ V ′, and Zψ = Z ′ψ′. The
conclusion now follows immediately from state supervenience. 2
Because of the equivalence lemma, there is a unique total ordering defined
on the set of all reward functions, which we once again write as  (note that it
is state-independent).
Nullity Lemma: Suppose that:
(i) P is a quantum decision problem satisfying erasure, branch availabil-
ity and reward availability;
(ii) ψ is a state-dependent solution to P satisfying ordering, diachronic
consistency, macrostate indifference, branching indifference, and state
supervenience;
(iii) There exist rewards r, s with r  s.
Then an event E is null with respect to a state ψ and an act U iff
〈ψ|U†ΠEU |ψ〉 = 0.
Proof: Let 〈ψ|U†ΠEU |ψ〉 = α. An event is null if and only if, given acts V
and W available at OU which are identical except on E, V U ∼ψ WU . Given
the Equivalence Lemma, any two such acts are equivalent whenever they have
the same weight function, so if E is null for ψ and U , any event E′ is null
with respect to some U ′ and ψ′ whenever 〈ψ′|U ′†Π′EU ′ |ψ′〉 = α. If α > 0, then
α > 1/N for some N . By combining branch availability with reward availability,
we can construct some act V and state ϕ with weight function
Wϕ(E1|V ) = 1/N
Wϕ(E2|V ) = α− 1/N
Wϕ(E3|V ) = 1− α
E1 ∨ E2 is null (wrt ϕ and V ), hence E1 is, hence any event with weight 1/N
is. Applying branch availability and reward availability again, we can find ϕ′,
W and F1, . . . FN such that Wϕ′(Fi|W ) = 1/N . Each Fi is null wrt ϕ′ and W ,
hence so is E . This contradicts premise (iii), since if all events are null then all
rewards are equivalent.
Conversely, suppose that some event has weight zero. Its nullity now follows
from state supervenience, since no change to the physical state is enacted by
any transformation restricted to that event. 2
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Dominance Lemma: Suppose that
(i) P is a quantum decision problem satisfying erasure, branch availabil-
ity and reward availability;
(ii) ψ is a state-dependent solution to P satisfying ordering, diachronic
consistency, macrostate indifference, branching indifference, and state
supervenience;
(iii) s, t are rewards with s  t.
(iv) f [α] is the reward function defined by f [α](s) = α, f [α](t) = 1 − α,
f [α](r) = 0 for all other r.
Then f [α]  f [β] iff α > β.
Proof: This is an easy corollary of the Nullity Lemma. Suppose α > β, then by
branch availability and reward availability, there will be some act A and state
ϕ with weight function
Wϕ(E1|A) = β
Wϕ(E2|A) = α− β
Wϕ(E3|A) = 1− α
By reward availability there exist sets of compatible acts {U1, U2, U3} and
{V1, V2, V3} such that Ui and Vi are available at Ei, and such that U1, V1 and
U2 have outcomes all lying in s and V2, U3 and V3 have outcomes all lying in t.
By macrostate indifference and branching indifference Ui 'χ Vi for any χ ∈ Ei
and in particular U2 χ V2 for any χ ∈ E2.
If we define
Wα = U1ΠE1 + U2ΠE2 + U3ΠE3 (25)
and
Wβ = V1ΠE1 + V2ΠE2 + V3ΠE3 (26)
then by diachronic consistency, since E2 is not null then Wα ·A ψ Wβ ·A. But
the reward functions of Wα · A and Wβ · A are f [α] and f [β] respectively, and
the conclusion follows.
Utility Lemma: Suppose that:
(i) P is a quantum decision problem satisfying erasure, branch availabil-
ity, and reward availability;
(ii) ψ is a state-dependent solution to P satisfying ordering, diachronic
consistency, macrostate indifference, branching indifference, and state
supervenience;
(iii) s, t are rewards with s  t.
(iv) us, ut are real numbers with us > ut.
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Then there is a unique real function u on the set [t, s] of rewards between
t and s such that for any macrostate E, any state ψ ∈ E, and any two
acts U, V available at E whose rewards lie a finite subset of S,
U ψ V whenever EUψ(U) > EUψ(V ) (27)
(where the expected utilities are defined with respect to u, of course) and
such that u(s) = us and u(t) = ut.
Proof: For simplicity we assume us = 1 and ut = 0 (other values lead to
a simple affine transformation of the utility function). We define the following
reward functions: f [α] is defined as in the Dominance Lemma, and g[r] is defined
by g[r](r′) = δr,r′ .
We now define u(r) by
u(r) = lub{α : g[r]  f [α]}. (28)
Let {un(r)} be a sequence of functions such that um(r) ≤ u(r) and limn→∞ un(r) =
u(r), and let U be any act available at E whose rewards lie in S. We write Er
for OU ∧ r and χr for the normalised projection of ψ onto Er.
From branching availability and reward availability, for each n we can find
a compatible set of states {An(r) : Rψ,U (r) 6= 0} such that An(r) is available
at Er and An has reward function f [un(r)]; we define An =
∑
r∈S An(r)ΠEr .
By construction, 1̂Er χr An(r) for all r and n, so by diachronic consistency
U ψ An · U .
By definition, the reward function of An · U (with respect to ψ) is f [λn],
where
λn =
∑
r∈S
Wψ(r|U)un(r). (29)
So if f [U ] is the reward function of U (with respect to ψ), we have established
that f [U ]  f [λn], and hence by the Dominance lemma, f [U ]  f [λ] whenever
λ < λn for some n. Since un(r) → u(r) for each n and r, λn → EUψ(U),and
hence f [U ]  f [λ] whenever λ < EUψ(U). Applying the same argument with a
decreasing sequence, f [U ] ≺ f [λ] whenever λ > EUψ(U).
Now suppose that U and V are two such acts with EUψ(U) > EUψ(V ).
Then for any α lying between the two expected utilities, there will exist an act
W with reward function (wrt ψ) f [α]. We have proved that U ψ W , and
W ψ V , so it follows that U ψ V .
To see that this utility function is unique, note that if there were another
utility function u′ we could construct acts whose utilities were the same as cal-
culated by this second utility, but not as calculated by the first; this contradicts
the requirements on u′. 2
Born Rule Theorem: Suppose that:
(i) P is a quantum decision problem satisfying erasure, branch availabil-
ity, reward availability and problem continuity;
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(ii) ψ is a state-dependent solution to P satisfying ordering, diachronic
consistency, macrostate indifference, branching indifference, state su-
pervenience, and solution continuity.
Then there is a function u on the rewards of P, unique up to positive
affine transformations, such that if EU denotes the expected utility with
respect to this function,
U ψ V iff EUψ(U) > EUψ(V ). (30)
Proof: Note that problem continuity and solution continuity jointly entail that
if U ψ U ′, there are neighborhoods N ,N ′ of U and U ′ respectively such that
all acts in N and N ′ are available and all acts in N are preferred (given ψ) to
all acts in N ′. For simplicity I shall refer to this simply as continuity.
We begin by proving that if s  r1  r2  t, then if the utilities determined
by the Utility Lemma (via this choice of s and t) for r1 and r2 coincide, then
r1 ∼ r2. Let this utility function be u and again, for convenience take u(s) = 1
and u(t)=0. Fix E and ψ ∈ E, and let U1 and U2 be acts available at E whose
ranges lie in r1 and r2 respectively (by reward availability, some such acts exist).
If r1  r2, then U1 ψ U2. By continuity, there must exist neighborhoods N1,
N2 of U1 and U2 such that any available act in N1 is preferred (given ψ) to any
available act in N2.
Now let f1[α] and f2[α] be reward functions with f1[α](r1) = 1−α, f1[α](t) =
α and f2[α](r2) = 1 − α, f2[α](s) = α. By branch availability and reward
availability, there must exist some α, and some acts Ui,α, such that Ui,α ∈ Ni
and the reward function of Ui,α (with respect to ψ) is fi[α].
So we have that U1,α  U2,α. But EUψ(U1,α) < EU(U1) ≡ u(r1), and
EUψ(U2,α) > EU(U2) ≡ u(r2). So by the Utility lemma we must have that
u(r1) > u(r2).
We can now define a utility function for the whole of R. For any rewards
r1, r2 with r1  r2, and any real numbers x1, x2 with x1 > x2, I will write
u[r1, r2, x1, x2] for the unique utility function determined on [r2, r1] by setting
the utility of ri to xi.
Now, let s, t be any two rewards with s  t (if there are no such rewards,
the theorem is true trivially). I define the utility of any reward r by:
• If s  r  t, u(r) = u[s, t, 1, 0](r).
• If r  s, u(r) is the unique value fixed by requiring that u[r, t, u(r), 0](s) =
1.
• If t  r, u(r) is the unique value fixed by requiring that u[s, r, 1, u(r)](s) =
0.
(Notice that this definition relies on the assumption that the utilities of s and t
are guaranteed to be distinct.)
I now prove that for acts with finitely many rewards, if U1 ψ U2 then
EUψ(U1) > EUψ(U2). For suppose that U1 ψ U2. By continuity, if f is the
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reward function of Û1 (with respect to ψ) then it will be possible to find some
act V with reward function g such that, for some rewards r1 and r2 with r1  r2:
• V ψ U ;
• If r 6= r1 and r 6= r2, g(r) = f(r);
• g(r1) < f(r1); g(r2) > f(r2).
This means that we must have EUψ(V ) ≥ EUψ(U2); since EUψ(V ) < EUψ(U1),
it follows that EUψ(U1) > EUψ(U2).
This suffices to prove the Born Rule Theorem under the assumption that
any act has only finitely many non-null rewards. To extend to the infinite case,
let U1 and U2 be arbitrary acts, and suppose for some ψ that U1 ψ U2. By
continuity, if f1 and f2 are the reward functions (given ψ) of U1 and U2, it will
be possible to find a finite subset R0 of R, and acts V1, V2 with reward functions
g1, g2, such that:
• V1 ψ V2;
• gi(r) = fi(r) for r ∈ R0;
• If r /∈ R0, then g1(r) = s, and g2(r) = t, where s  t.
Since V1 and V2 have only finitely many non-null rewards, EUψ(V1) > EUψ(V2).
But by construction EUψ(U1) > EUψ(V1) and EUψ(U2) < EUψ(V2), so EUψ(U1) >
EUψ(U2). 2
9 Other proposed strategies for action
In the nine years since Deutsch’s original paper on decision-theoretic probabil-
ity, a bewildering variety of alternative strategies for rational action have been
proposed in the literature and in discussion. Some of these strategies have inde-
pendent motivations; some are purely meant as counter-examples; all contradict
the Born rule, and so all violate the decision-theoretic axioms of this paper.
This being the case, perhaps there is little need to discuss the alternative
strategies: a proof is a proof. On the other hand, it may be instructive to
show exactly how some of these alternative proposals violate my axiom scheme:
apart from casting light on the motivation for the axioms, this may show how
what appear to be coherent and even plausible strategies come apart on close
inspection.
The proposed counter-examples, as will become apparent, break into four
categories. There are the “wrong-probability” rules, which also require an agent
to maximise expected utility but with respect to some probability measure other
than the Born rule. There are the ‘no-probability” rules, which (purportedly)
cannot be represented in terms of expected utilities at all. There are what
might be called the “I-don’t-want-to-play” rules, which are not so much positive
strategies as arguments against the existence of any strategy. And one special
group, the contextual strategies, deserve a category of their own.
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Branch counting
Description: each branch is given an equal probability, so that if there are N
branches following a particular experiment, each branch is given probabil-
ity 1/N . Utility is then maximised with respect to this probability.
Origin: Has been reinvented innumerable times, but the first proponent may
have been Graham, in DeWitt and Graham (1973).
Rationale: Each branch contains a copy of me; none of them can detect, nor
care about, their quantum-mechanical weight; so I should not care about
that weight either, and so I have no reason to prefer one over another.
Why it is irrational: The first thing to note about branch counting is that it
can’t actually be motivated or even defined given the structure of quantum
mechanics. There is no such thing as “branch count”: as I noted earlier,
the branching structure emergent from unitary quantum mechanics does
not provide us with a well-defined notion of how many branches there
are. All quantum mechanics really allows us to say is that there are some
versions of me for each outcome.
But within the stylised context of my decision theory, the branch count is
defined, so of course (given the representation theorem) the branch count-
ing rule must violate some of my axioms. In fact, it violates the combi-
nation of branching indifference and diachronic consistency. For consider
two acts A1 and A2: A1 consists of a two-outcome measurement (a spin
measurement, say) followed by a reward of utility r in the spin-up branch.
A2 consists of A1, followed by another two-outcome measurement in the
spin-up branch. By branching indifference, the agent who gets the reward
is indifferent about whether or not he makes a further measurement; by
diachronic consistency, then, the original agent is indifferent between A1
and A2. But the utility of A1 (in which there are 2 branches, one of which
provides a reward) is r/2; the utility of A2 is 2r/3.
The fatness rule
Description: each branch is given a probability proportional to its quantum-
mechanical weight multiplied by the mass of the agent in kilograms (such
that the total probability is equal to one). Utility is maximised with
respect to this probability.
Origin: David Albert (in conversation, and in his contribution to this volume).
Rationale: Albert says, tongue-in-cheek, that an agent should care about branches
where he is fatter because “there is more of him” on that branch. He isn’t
serious, though: the rule is purely presented as a counter-example.
Why it is irrational: It violates diachronic consistency. Albert’s agent is (ex
hypothesi) indifferent to dieting. But he is not indifferent to whether his
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future selves diet: he wants the ones on branches with good outcomes to
gain weight, and the ones on branches with bad outcomes to lose weight.
This is perhaps a good point to recall the rationale for diachronic con-
sistency: rational action takes place over time and is incompatible with
widespread conflict between stages of an agent’s life. In the case of the
fatness rule, agents have motivation to coerce their future selves — by
hiring “minders”, say — into dietary programs that they will resist. Mul-
tiply this conflict indefinitely many times (for branching is ubiquitous)
and rational action becomes impossible.
(To object “maybe rational action is impossible in the Everett interpreta-
tion” would, as noted before, be facile. It’s perfectly possible for an agent
following the Born rule.)
The fake-state rule
Description: The agent maximises expected utilities as for the Born rule, but
using a quantum state other than the physically real one.
Origin: Suggested many times in conversation.
Rationale: None in particular, though it is often intended to undermine the
connection between the “real” state and the physics.
Why it is irrational: It violates state supervenience. There will be cases
where two acts produce the same physical state but where one produces
a different fake state than the other. (This is inevitable: any two distinct
quantum states are invariant under different sets of transformations.) The
fake-state rule will then give the acts different utilities; state supervenience
rules this out. Or, put another way: the fake state rule assigns different
values to the same physical state under two different descriptions.
Note that it is crucial here — as elsewhere in decision theory — that the
agent has a choice between different actions, and therefore between dif-
ferent sets of histories and weights. Of course, in a deterministic universe
it is fixed which action will actually occur, but this does not remove the
necessity of defining preferences, and hence indirectly probabilities, over
a wide range of actions.
The distributive-justice rule
Description: The agent does not maximise expected utilities at all. He treats
his various successors in rather the way that a just ruler would treat his
various subjects: in particular, he will not allow the suffering of one even
if it brings great advantage to others.
Origin: Huw Price (this volume).
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Rationale: Any action we choose generates a multitude of individuals; we have
a duty to treat them all ethically, and in particular we would not be
morally justified in letting one suffer unduly for the others’ benefit.
Why it is irrational: The rule is very underspecified, so it isn’t easy to answer
this, but on natural precisifications it either violates continuity or is not
actually a counterexample to the Born rule.
To expand: a large part of what Price wants can be achieved by an appro-
priate utility function. An agent moved by Price’s concerns can drastically
increase the disutility of bad consequences and scale down the utility of
good consequences, with the effect that trade-offs of the sort he considers
get a much lower utility and so will tend to be rejected in favour of more
equitable options. There is nothing in Everettian decision theory that
prevents an agent from making such modifications to their utility function
on recognising the ethical consequences of the Everett interpretation.13
If Price wants to hold that no amount of suffering, however low-weight the
branch on which it occurs, is acceptable, then this strategy will not work,
but there is a clash with Continuity. Suppose there are three rewards r1
and r2 with r1  r2, and a (dire) punishment p. Price will prefer r1 to r2
but will prefer r2 to (1−w)r1 +wp, whatever the value of w; clearly this
violates continuity.
Now, I think the physical arguments for continuity are pretty unassailable,
but it is worth noting that the principle is only really used in my proof
precisely to rule out infinite or infinitesimal utilities. (The only other use
is for the mathematically convenient but physically tangential purpose
of extending the Born rule to the case of infinitely many rewards.) If
such utilities are allowed, there is no problem with extending the Born
rule to cover even Price’s case (though the utility function will have to be
modelled in non-standard analysis and the maths will start getting fiddly.)
And in fact, precisely the same situation has arisen in classical decision
theory, and the structure axioms of classical decision theory are selected
precisely to rule out the case of infinite (dis)utility.
The variety rule
Description: An agent prefers A to B, but prefers receiving A in half the
branches and B in the other half to either A or B.
Author: Suggested in a seminar by Adam Elga in 2004; has not appeared in
print as far as I am aware.
Rationale: An agent may regret having to make one choice or another, and
may rather like the idea that one version of himself makes one choice, one
another. (In Elga’s example, a student prefers physics to history but likes
13Personally, though, I don’t feel inclined to. Call me callous.
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both; that student might prefer to do history in one branch, physics in
the other.)
Why it is irrational: It either violates diachronic consistency, or it isn’t a
counter-example to the Born rule.
To expand: suppose you are the agent who chose history. What prevents
you changing your mind and switching to physics? It doesn’t, after all,
hurt your counterpart in the physics branch. This would clearly violate
diachronic consistency.
But perhaps you wouldn’t choose to switch back. That’s to say that
although you prefer doing physics to doing history, you prefer doing history
as a result of a situation in which a certain process chose history for you
rather than doing physics against the result of that process. In that case,
the utility you are assigning to (history-after-process) is higher than the
utility you assign to (physics-against-process), and indeed higher than
(physics-without-process). The different situations in which you end up
doing history count as different rewards.
Exactly analogous situations can arise in classical decision theory. A stu-
dent might decide that on balance he’d rather do physics than history,
but nonetheless resolves to decide by the toss of a coin (because, say, he
finds it comforting to have the decision taken from his hands; the reader
can probably supply other motivations). That student, again, will place
a higher utility on (history after coin toss) than on (physics).
Of course, if every outcome’s utility depended sensitively on the circum-
stances in which that reward arose, decision theory couldn’t get off the
ground: there would be no way to define probability without being able
to have the same reward available in different acts. But again, this is not
specific to quantum decision theory.
The anything-goes rule
Description: Not so much a “rule” as a rejection of the need to have one:
according to this position, any transitive preference ordering over acts is
rationally acceptable.
Origin: Suggested by Tim Maudlin in seminars on multiple occasions; fre-
quently suggested in conversations.
Rationale: Everettian quantum theory is deterministic, and we already have
a perfectly acceptable deterministic decision theory: its only axiom is
transitivity. So any transitive ordering should be fine.
Why it is irrational: Even in deterministic decision theory, transitivity is not
the only constraint. Rational agency is not possible without diachronic
consistency; in addition, preference orders have to be defined on actual
physical acts, so mathematical modelling of those orders should require
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an agent to be indifferent between the same state of affairs differently
defined. Furthermore, the only interesting decision-theoretic strategies
are those which are physically performable in at least an idealised sense.
All of the rationality axioms of this paper fit into one of these categories;
even in deterministic decision theory, then, they are rationally required.
The curl-up-and-die rule
Description: The converse of the anything-goes rule, this is not so much a
“rule” for rational action as the claim that no rational strategy is possible
in Everettian quantum theory.
Origin: Frequently suggested in conversation.
Rationale: Various; see below.
Why it is irrational: Unless there is something concretely wrong with the
Born rule, there is no case to be made that no rational strategy is available:
the Born rule is available.
I am aware of two general objections to the rationality of the Born rule,
though. The first is that it is rationally compulsory for an agent to weight
each branch equally; since the Born rule violates this requirement, it can-
not be rational (and if only the Born rule is rational, rationality is im-
possible in an Everettian universe). Arguments are seldom given for the
suggestion that this is a rational requirement (I can see that at best it
might be a rational desideratum, but it’s not at all clear to me why, in
a universe where it isn’t physically possible to obey the requirement, we
should be unable to settle for some second-best option). In any case,
though (at the risk of repetitiveness) there is no coherent notion of branch
count available in quantum mechanics, so it’s not even meaningful to talk
of “weighting each branch equally”.
The other objection (frequently made in discussions, and made in print
by Hemmo and Pitowsky (2007)) is that no strategy can be rational if
it can be known in advance by those adopting it that some of them (or
some of their successors) will make wrong decisions. So in particular, it
is a corollary of the Born rule that an agent measuring a long succession
of identical quantum systems should regard the observed frequencies as
a guide to what state each system is in; but since all sequences of re-
sults occur somewhere, some of the agent’s successors will get the wrong
outcome.
Now, it is true that some agents will indeed be misled in this way. But
there is nothing particularly quantum-mechanical about this. If the uni-
verse is spatially infinite (as current observations support), we can guar-
antee that somewhere in the universe are people as similar to us as you
like but whose observed statistics have systematically misled them. Even
on Earth, one can fairly easily come up with similar examples. Suppose
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that the British government declared that it puts some people under (non-
covert) surveillance at random, but that there are very few such people:
only one in ten million. And suppose it is claimed that the government is
lying, and actually puts many more people than that (tens of thousands,
say) under surveillance. Then each person in Britain is rational to adopt
the strategy: if I am under surveillance, the government is (almost cer-
tainly) lying — even though they know that if the government is not lying,
five or six people in Britain will be misled into thinking it was.
Ultimately, some people get unlucky. There is no contradiction between
this and the rationality of a decision-theoretic strategy, provided that
strategy tells us not to care about the unlucky cases. The Born rule
tells us exactly that.
Non-contextual rules
Description: An agent’s preferences conform to a probability rule that violates
the principle of non-contextuality: that is, it assigns different probabilities
to the outcomes of a measurement of operator X̂ according to whether or
not a compatible operator Ŷ is measured at the same time.
Origin: Various, but a particularly forceful advocacy can be found in (Hemmo
and Pitowsky 2007).
Rationale: As is well known, any non-contextual quantum probability rule
(and hence, any strategy for rational action expressible in terms of such a
rule) can be proved to be the Born rule applied to some (possibly mixed)
state.14 The suspicion, then, is that the decision-theoretic arguments
are just a combination of Gleason’s theorem (or a relative of it) with
an unjustified assumption of non-contextuality.
Why it is irrational: Probably the easiest way to explain what is wrong with
non-contextual rules is that they violate State Supervenience. If we regard
measurements as physical processes rather than as primitive, which oper-
ator(s) are being measured in a given process is dependent on the interests
of the experimenter, and cannot simply be read off from the physics. (Con-
sider the Stern-Gerlach experiment, for instance: is it a measurement of
spin, or of position?) For a decision rule to be non-contextual, then, is for
a rational agent to prefer a given act to the same act (knowably the same
act, in fact) under a different description, which obviously violates State
Supervenience (and, I hope, is obviously irrational).
14This is usually explained in terms of Gleason’s Theorem, but this is a rather outdated
approach now that POVMs, not PVMs, are widely — and in my view correctly — seen
as the best way to represent measurements in quantum theory. Most of the mathematical
complexity of Gleason’s theorem can be dispensed with if we require our probability function
to be defined on POVMs and not just PVMs. See (Caves, Fuchs, Manne, and Renes 2004)
for further discussion.
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It is fair to note, though, that just as a non-primitive approach to mea-
surement allows one and the same physical process to count as multiple
abstractly construed measurements, it also allows one and the same ab-
stractly construed measurement to be performed by multiple physical pro-
cesses. It is then a non-trivial fact, and in a sense a physical analogue of
non-contextuality, that rational agents are indifferent to which particular
process realises a given measurement.
In earlier work (Wallace 2003; Wallace 2007) I called this factmeasurement
neutrality. It is indeed a tacit premise in Deutsch’s original Deutsch (1999)
proof of the Born rule, as I argued in Wallace (2003). In this paper, it is
a theorem (a trivial corollary of the main representation theorem, in fact)
that measurement neutrality is rationally required. The short answer as
to why is that two acts which correspond to the same abstractly construed
measurement can be transformed into the same act via processes to which
rational agents are indifference. To see the long answer, re-read sections 4–
8.
Incidentally, Gleason’s theorem (or more accurately its POVM generalisa-
tion) is much more directly needed if we wish to generalise the results of
this paper to situations where the quantum state is unknown to the agent.
The details are somewhat involved; see Wallace (2010) for an account.
10 Conclusion
A rational agent, believing that the Everett interpretation is true and that
the quantum state of a given system is |ψ〉, knows that measurements on that
state will generally split his part of the multiverse into multiple branches, with
different measurement outcomes, and different versions of the agent, on different
branches; he also knows that the relative weights of these branches are given
by the Born rule, applied to the post-measurement state of the system and
measurement device. Rationality considerations not different in kind to those
which apply in single-universe decision making then compel the agent to act as
if a set of branches of relative weight w has probability w. In other words, he is
rationally required to act as if the Born rule is true.
As I noted in the introduction, my focus here is deliberately narrow and I
leave it to other chapters in this volume (and to my own work elsewhere) to
make the case that such a result suffices to justify the general role of probability
in the Everett interpretation. Yet even on its own terms it is a rather remarkable
result, as Deutsch’s opening quotation notes, and one which to the best of my
knowledge has no analogue outside the branching-universe context.
And how does this result actually come about? The decision-theoretic lan-
guage in which this paper is written is no doubt necessary to make a prop-
erly rigorous case and to respond to those who doubt the very coherence of
Everettian probability, but in a way the central core of the argument is not
decision-theoretic at all. What is really going on is that the quantum state
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has certain symmetries and the probabilities are being constrained by those
symmetries.
This is actually a throwback to an older idea of probability. Quantitative
probability has been concerned with symmetry ever since it was applied to the
throw of dice in the 17th century: what makes it reasonable to regard each side
of a die as equiprobable is that we have no reason to regard one as more probable
than another, and what prevents us having reason is the rotational symmetry
of the die that maps one side to another. But real dice — real classical dice, at
any rate — must break the symmetry by their initial conditions, or else how in a
deterministic universe could the die land one way rather than another. We then
have to impose a certain probability distribution on the die’s initial conditions,
and any prospect of a reductive analysis of probability is lost. In Everettian
quantum mechanics, there is no one actual outcome, no requirement for the
symmetry to be broken by the actual state of the system, and so a program of
deriving the probabilities from the symmetries remains viable. The language of
decision theory makes rigorous sense of what such a derivation would look like,
and shows — I claim — that the program can indeed be carried out.
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